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THE RISE OF AMERICA'S TWO NATIONAL
PASTIMES: BASEBALL AND THE.LAW
Cleta Deatherage Mitchell*
LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW. By Roger I. Abrams.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1998. Pp.xi, 226. $27.95.

Mark McGwire's seventieth home run ball sold at auction in
January of this year for $3,005,000.1
In late 1998, Baltimore Orioles owner Peter Angelos sued a for
mer Orioles manager and his daughter in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. Angelos alleged that the original lineup card from
the 1995 game when Cal Ripken, Jr., broke Lou Gehrig's consecu
tive game record belongs to the Orioles, not to the former manager
and certainly not to his daughter.2
There may be no crying in baseball,3 but there is money. And
wherever earthly treasure gathers two or more, a legal system
arises. From this confluence of forces is born Legal Bases: Baseball
and the Law, a recent addition to that burgeoning genre of nonfic
tion works about the business and law of baseball.

Legal Bases intends to inform a lay audience about basic legal
concepts that have shaped baseball as well as other aspects of
American law and culture: antitrust law and monopolies, collective
bargaining, labor arbitration, enforcement of private contractual
rights, and an overview of the civil justice system. In the process,
author Roger I. Abrams4 introduces Legal Bases as a teaching tool
that uses baseball as the backdrop to discuss the role in American
society of law, legal institutions, and private ordering in the devel
opment of a significant American business enterprise (p.3).
In the preface, Abrams writes that he knew as a Little Leaguer
"that baseball would be an important part of my life....To com
bine baseball and law in one project fulfills this Little Leaguer's
* Partner, Sullivan & Mitchell, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C. B.A. 1973, J.D. 1975,
University of Oklahoma. Ms. Mitchell has represented the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA) and has written about baseball for USA Today.
Ed.
1. See WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at Bl ("$3 million: McGwire's 70th HR ball is auc
tioned off'' ).
2. See Lineup Card Decision Delayed, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Jan. 4-10,
1999, at 40.
3. See LoWELL GANZ & BABALOO MANDEL, A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN (1992).
4. Dean of the Rutgers Law School, professor of sports law, and self-described ardent
baseball fan. Abrams also serves as a major league baseball salary arbitrator, having decided
such cases as those involving Ron Darling (pitcher) and Brett Butler (outfielder). P. ix.
-
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dream" (p. ix). He goes on to advise that "[i]t is a lawyer's respon
sibility as a guardian of [the legal] system to teach the public about
the legal process. . . . Baseball is tailor-made for this educational
purpose, filled with colorful characters and perfect examples of the
legal process in action" (p. x). Abrams's discussion "draws on both
baseball and the legal process [to] show[ ] the law in operation, for
better or for worse" (p. 3).
Baseball metaphors abound here as in most writing on the na
tional pastime.5 Abrams organizes Legal Bases around nine "All
Stars" culled from baseball's 150 years. Each represents a different
chapter in baseball's legal history and embodies a different legal
concept important to the development of the law relative to base
ball. As this book evidences, the term "baseball nonfiction" can be
oxymoronic. Well-written, interesting, informative, and often en
tertaining, Legal Bases is nonetheless shaded by assorted baseball
"fictions" and liberal political orthodoxy.
B ASEBALL AND

THE RISE

OF AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS

John Montgomery "Monte" Ward

The opening chapter traces the origins of baseball in the nine
teenth century and the rise of the National League and organized
baseball. Abrams relates those events to the beginnings of the la
bor union movement and issues related to business regulation
through the legal process.
Connecting this era of baseball and the law is Monte Ward, a
pitcher for the New York Giants in the mid-1880s who, according to
Abrams, was "[t]he only player in major-league history to win 100
games as a pitcher and collect 2,000 hits as a batter" (p. 7). "Ward,
a Columbia-trained lawyer, organized the first players' union and
created the ill-fated Players League that challenged the National
League in 1890" (p.7).
Abrams, discussing the efforts led by Ward in the 1890s to or
ganize professional baseball players for collective representation,
describes how and why those efforts failed. Abrams states that
"[a]n organization of players would not play an important role
again until the 1960s."6
5. Some examples of titles for otherwise serious legal scholarship on the subject of law
and baseball: Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: It's Going, Going
Gone!, 20 NovA L. REv. 1231 (1996); Eric D. Scheible, Note, No Runs. No Hits. One Error:
Eliminating Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Will Not Save the Game, 73 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 73 (1995); Kathleen A. Turland, Note, Major League Baseball and
Antitrust: Bottom of the Ninth, Bases Loaded, Two Outs, Full Count and Congress Takes a
Swing, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1329 (1995). You get the picture.
6. P. 25. For a more detailed and illuminating discussion of how the MLBPA ultimately
came into existence and established itself on behalf of the players, see MARVIN MILLER, A
WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLGAME (1991).
.

.
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Initially, Abrams is sympathetic to the players' plight as un
derpaid underdogs for most of the game's history, a tenor that is
much diminished by Chapter Nine and the accounts of modem
baseball. This shift closely tracks the evolution of baseball fans' at
titudes generally. It seems that most fans favored the players' get
ting their fair share of the baseball financial pie right up until the
time when it actually started to happen.
BASEBALL

AND

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

Napoleon "Nap" Lajoie
Nap Lajoie, who Abrams calls "[t]he greatest second baseman
of all time,"7 is the second "batter" in Abrams's All-Star baseball
legal history "lineup." In addition to his skills on the field, Lajoie is
remembered for his role in one of the early legal proceedings in
volving baseball. Lajoie left the National League Phillies in 1901 to
play for the Athletics in the newly formed American League, trig
gering a legal dispute over Lajoie's rights and obligations under his
player contract (pp. 27, 31-36). This chapter, and this era in base
ball, cover the full breadth of first-year law school curriculum: pri
vate contracts and their enforcement, with brief descriptions of the
federal and state court systems, the notion of full faith and credit,
negative injunctions, consent, mutuality, specific performance, and
the general circumstances under which courts will enforce private
agreements.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1902 found in favor of the
Phillies in their suit to keep Lajoie from playing for the Athletics,
determining that Lajoie was not "readily replaceable" by another
player at his position (p. 34). On the issue of "mutuality," the court
determined that, while the terms of the contract were not necessar
ily equal as between the parties, because Lajoie was paid a "large
salary" by the Phillies,8 the contract was enforceable through the
issuance of a negative injunction. Thus, while the court could not
and did not order Lajoie to play for the Phillies, it enjoined him
from playing for the Athletics, or any other team (pp. 34-36). What
Abrams calls the "[c]urious [a]ftermath" of the Lajoie decision was
that the Athletics then traded Lajoie to the Cleveland Blues (p. 40).
The Ohio courts refused to apply the legal principle of "full faith
and credit"; they declined to enforce the Pennsylvania court's deci7. P. 27. Lajoie was an original inductee into the Baseball Hall of Fame at Cooperstown
as one of the Eleven Immortals. Pp. 29-30. Baseball enthusiasts might argue, however,
about his being the greatest second baseman of all time, citing Rogers Hornsby as a possible
competitor for that title. SeeBILL JAMES, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE HALL OF FAME?
174 (1995).
8. Seep. 35 ("Although not paid as much as he wished, Lajoie's salary was, in fact, more
than ten times the earnings of the average laborer of the time.").
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sion. Lajoie consequently continued to play for Cleveland, except
when the team traveled to Pennsylvania, where he was prohibited
by that state's highest court from playing for any club but the
Phillies. The signing in 1903 of the National Agreement between
the National and American Leagues allowed Lajoie to play for his
team even in Pennsylvania (pp. 40-41).
BASEBALL AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Curt Flood

At the heart of Legal Bases is one of the enduring myths of
baseball, beginning with the discussion in Chapter Three. Much of
the recent literature on baseball describes how the United States
Supreme Court, in one of its worst decisions ever, ruled in 1922 that
the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to baseball because base
ball was not engaged in interstate commerce. Thus armed, the
baseball owners were allowed to function as a cartel for the next
fifty years, running roughshod over the baseball players and the
sport itself. There happens to be enough truth in the story of the
ruling's impact to foster general agreement of its validity.9
It is an unfortunate shortcoming of the book, however, that
someone of Abrams's apparent legal scholarship does not examine
this particular baseball legend in any depth. The absence of serious
contemplative discussion of antitrust regulation of baseball is disap
pointing and renders the book less valuable than it otherwise might
have been.
Chapter Three explains the economics of and justifications for
the reserve system,10 the origins of antitrust law, and such legal con
cepts as restraint of trade and stare decisis. More importantly, the
chapter focuses on the Supreme Court's decisions in three antitrust
cases, now known as the "baseball trilogy": Federal Base Ball Club
of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 11 Toolson v. New York Yankees, 12 and Flood v. Kuhn.13
Federal Base Ball arose in 1915 when the Federal Base Ball

League organized to compete against the existing leagues: the
National League, the oldest league in Organized Baseball, and its
9. For a thorough and wholly unsympathetic history of the baseball owners, see JoHN
HELYAR, LoRDs OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994).
10. The reserve system is based on a clause in the baseball player's contract that
"reserves" his services to the contracting ball club for not only the original contract year, but
also for each year thereafter that the contract is extended at the unilateral discretion of the
club. See pp. 45-47; MILLER, supra note 6, at 238-39.
11. Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Profi. Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
12. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (mem.; per curiam).
13. Flood v. Kuhn, 470 U.S. 258 (1972).
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junior counterpart, the American League. The three leagues, after
some years of competing, and, after federal antitrust litigation had
been filed by the Federal League in Chicago in January 1915, set
tled their differences in December 1915 (p. 55). This was due in no
small part to the death of one of the Federal League's key financial
backers in October 1915.14 The club in Baltimore, however, refused
to join the settlement and initiated its own lawsuit. The Baltimore
club argued unsuccessfully that the National and American Leagues
had engaged in illegal business practices against it in violation of
the Sherman Act (pp. 56-58). The Supreme Court's test in Federal
Base Ball was whether a baseball game was a "good" or "product"
being imported from one state to another. Using that test, the High
Court concluded that a game of baseball is primarily an exhibition,
the transport of which across state lines is merely incidental to the
enterprise.15 While commentators have long derided the Court's
decision in Federal Base Ball, 16 some analysts have observed that
the holding in Federal Base Ball can only be read to extend to a
"particular business at a particular time - the business of exhibi
tion baseball as it existed in 1922 - and [that it] was not intended
to extend further."17
Other lower court decisions after 1922 considered and applied
Federal Base Ball, 18 but the Supreme Court did not review the ap
plication of the federal antitrust laws to organized baseball again
until Toolson in 1953.19 This time, the fact situation presented to
the Court was not the organization of the leagues, but the reserve
clause in player contracts (p. 60).
The Toolson Court determined that for more than thirty years
organized baseball had relied on Federal Base Ball and the indus
try's "understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust leg
islation." It concluded that "if there are evils in this field which
now warrant application to [organized baseball] of the antitrust
laws it should be by legislation."20 Recognizing that "Congress . . .
had the [Federal Base Ball) ruling under consideration but [had] not
seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation hav14. See Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John P. Rossi, A History and Analysis of Baseball's
Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 VILL SPORTS & ENT. L. F. 213, 234 (1995).
15. See Federal Base Ball 259 U.S. at 209.
16. P. 58; see also BASEBALL
Waller et al. eds., 1995).
17. See McMahon

&

AND TiiE

AMERICAN

LEGAL MIND 78 (Spencer Weber

Rossi, supra note 14, at 236.

18. See Martin v. National League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949); Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. See Toolson v. New York Yankees 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
20. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
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ing prospective effect," the Court in 1953 declined to reverse

Federal Base Bazz.21
Crucial to a complete understanding of the legal, political, and
economic history of baseball is the context in which Toolson was
considered by the High Court. Abrams barely addresses this as
pect. Without a thorough account of the proceedings in Congress
at the time of Toolson, it is difficult to understand the Court's deci
sion. But given the broader picture, it is evident that the Supreme
Court was not acting in a vacuum. In 1951 Congress had begun
hearings into various aspects of baseball and its antitrust exemp
tions. Hearings on the subject continued in 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957,
1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1964, and 1965, as Congress sought to "put
pressure on baseball to do various things: to expand, to improve
the situation of the minor leagues, or to bend to constituent desires
for more television or radio coverage. "22 For the first time in the
sport's history Congress began to examine how baseball was organ
ized and how baseball decisions were made.
It is against this screen that the Supreme Court in Toolson de
cided to let Congress, not the courts, decide the issue of the applica
bility of the antitrust laws to baseball. Abrams concludes that the
Court's decision in Toolson is "indefensible" (p. 62). Abrams ar
gues that "Congress's failure ...to act is perfectly understandable"
because, in Abrams's view,

[b]aseball was too hot an issue to address, and members of Congress
[feared] the owners' ... clout. Although Congress may be excused
for reacting in a political manner - it is, after all, supposed to re
spond to political forces - nothing can excuse the Supreme Court's
timidity or the duplicity of baseball counsel in misleading Congress.
[p. 62]
It is Abrams's analysis that is indefensible. Regardless of the sub
ject matter, such ill-conceived drivel is precisely the problem with
American jurisprudence in the late twentieth century. There is no
constitutional authority for the federal judiciary to supplant the leg
islative branch of government in order to protect Congress from
political forces.23
21. See

Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.

22. See JAMES EDWARD

MILLER, THE BASEBALL BusINES s

6 (1990).

See Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact: Hearings on S.J.Res.26
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate
Comm.on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.21 (1997) (statement of former United States Attorney
23.

General Edwin Meese III) ("[T]o combine judicial power with executive and legislative au
thority was the 'very definition of tyranny' ...."(quoting James Madison)); id.at 22 ("'The
Founding Fathers were clear on this issue. For them, the question involved in judicial re
straint was not - as it is not - will we have liberal courts or conservative courts? ... The
question was and is, will we have government by the people?"' (quoting President Ronald
Reagan)).
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Yet that is precisely what Abrams advocates here. Whatever
the issue, Congress is constitutionally charged to make legislative
determinations,24 even if such decisions are difficult and even if the
decision is to maintain the status quo. For the federal judiciary to
be cast in the role of substituting its judgment for that of Congress
in order to spare the national legislature political repercussions is
certainly not in keeping with any theory of thoughtful jurispru
dence. It is cause for serious dismay that the dean of a respected
law school envisions such a constitutional duty for the Supreme
Court and advances that notion to the public as a self-described
"guardian" of the legal system (p.x).
The third and final Supreme Court decision in the "baseball tril
ogy" came in 1972 in Flood, 25 when the Court essentially restated
its decision in Toolson that any change in baseball's legal status
should come from Congress. The Court did, however, limit the ap
plication of Flood solely to professional baseball.26
Curt Flood was an outfielder for the St.Louis Cardinals, traded
to Philadelphia as part of a multiplayer swap on October 7, 1969.
Flood refused to report to the Phillies for personal and philosophi
cal reasons, including a concern about the hostility of Philadelphia
fans to black players. He wrote to baseball Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn: "'After 12 years in the Major Leagues, I do not feel I am a
piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I
believe that any system which produces that result violates my basic
rights as a citizen' " (p. 65). Flood, with the help of a reorganized
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), brought an
action in federal court challenging baseball's judicially created ex
emption from antitrust law. The litigation ultimately resulted in a
decision against Flood by the Supreme Court, leading the players'
union to understand, according to Abrams, that "if [they] were go
ing to improve their lot, it would have to be through collective ac
tion, economic strength, and private dispute resolution, not through
traditional court litigation based on public laws" (p.69).
It is unfortunately true that Americans subscribe to a notion
that virtually every modem problem can be resolved via this "tradi
tional" two-step process: passage of federal legislation followed by
a sorting of the law's meaning and application through the federal
judicial system. Such a "tradition" is far from the federal judiciary's
role as described during the debates on the Constitution.27
24. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U. S.CoNST. art. I, § 1.
25. See Flood v. Kuhn, 470 U. S. 258 (1972).
26. See Flood, 470 U.S. at 283-84 ("[T]here is merit in consistency even though some
might claim that beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsistency. ").
27. See THE FEDERALIST No.81, at 545-46 (Alexander Hanillton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. ,
1961) ("It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary encroach-
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As an expert in the field Abrams should welcome the Supreme
Court's decision in Flood as a grand opportunity for the application
of labor, not antitrust, law. Those processes are far preferable to
ongoing litigation, government micromanagement, or direct regula
tion (a frightening idea that has actually been proposed by some in
Congress and elsewhere).28 The Supreme Court in Flood per
formed a greater service for baseball generally, and for the players
in particular, by refusing to enter the baseball arena at such a late
date.
The history of baseball serves as testimony to the existence of
avenues other than the federal courts to resolve issues, even the
seemingly intractable. Although Abrams doesn't connect the issues
of baseball's racial integration and its antitrust exemption, he does
acknowledge that baseball became an integrated sport not as a di
rective from the Congress or the courts, but rather through mecha
nisms outside either the judicial or legislative systems.

Branch Rickey and Charles 0. Finley
Branch Rickey29 has been properly idealized for his courageous
decision to bring Jackie Robinson into the Major Leagues in 1948.
The "private legal processes" that "control business relationships
within organized baseball" are the strength of the industry (p. 93).
In Chapter Five, Abrams describes the functioning of that private
system (pp. 93-97) and the process by which the game became ra
cially integrated (although not quite as easily as one might be led to
believe by Abrams's innocent account).30 But with regard to the
antitrust issue, Abrams takes a dim view of what he calls a "con
servative" judiciary with too unyielding a respect for the principle
of stare decisis.31
From a jurisprudential perspective, the Supreme Court exer
cised in the baseball trilogy a restraint long since, and regrettably
so, abandoned by the federal bench. In 1922 the High Court nar
rowly construed a broadly framed act of Congress in Federal Base
ments on the legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, is in real
ity a phantom. Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature
may now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconven
ience, or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the political system. This may be in
ferred with certainty from the general nature of the judicial power ... . There never can be
danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legisla
ture, would hazard the united resentment of the [legislative] body .... ").
28. See National Commission on Major League Baseball Act of 1994, S.2401, 103d Cong.
(introduced by Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ)); see also Turland, supra note 5, at 1365
n.224, 1387 n.332.
29. A revered University of Michigan Law School alumnus, Class of 1911.
30. See pp. 106-07;

Mn.I.ER, supra

note 22, at 39-40.

31. Pp. 63-64, 68-69. "[D]oes this mean courts should always refrain from overruling
their own misguided or outmoded precedent? " P. 68.
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Ball. That decision was followed by the Court's considered refusal

to reverse itself over ensuing decades. Such judicial restraint is con
sidered exemplary by those who yearn for adherence to original
constitutional principles. The idea advanced in Federal Base Ball is
this: not EVERYTHING the American citizenry can think of to do
is interstate commerce, thus conferring blanket authority on the
federal government to do whatever it can think of to do. Such a
notion seemed valid to the Founding Fathers in 1789, but had ap
parently become anachronistic to Abrams and others by 1998.32
The thinking evidenced by the Supreme Court in the baseball tril
ogy may not represent such dark hours in the Court's history as
Abrams and others lead us to believe.
Not only is Abrams's discussion of the baseball antitrust deci
sions inadequate from a philosophical perspective, but he also ne
glects several major points about antitrust law's evolution as related
to baseball. For instance, Abrams doesn't address the development
of, and relationship between, the areas of labor and antitrust law on
issues related to employment, other than a very brief reference in
the book's conclusion. Even that mention appears to be an after
thought (pp. 202-03). In cases having nothing to do with baseball,
certain exemptions (both statutory and nonstatutory) from antitrust
law have been created with respect to labor issues and collective
bargaining.33 As one analysis concludes: "Since these labor ex
emptions would supersede antitrust law, the exemptions would pro
vide a safe harbor for owners from most activities that would
normally be subject to antitrust charges."34
In 1996, the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 3s
stated that "one of [the] objectives [of labor laws] was to take from
antitrust courts the authority to determine, through application of
the antitrust laws, what is socially or economically desirable
collective-bargaining policy."36 The interrelation between labor
and antitrust law seems worthy of more than passing mention in a
book largely devoted to these two subjects.37
32. For a thorough discussion of the historical evolution of the expansion of the Com
merce Clause by Congress and the Supreme Court and the tension among the differing
schools of thought on the subject, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33. See NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 {2d Cir. 1995); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104-105, 113 {1994) {listing statutory exemptions from
antitrust laws for collective bargaining by labor unions).
34. Kohm, supra note 5, at 1249.
35. 518 U.S. 231 {1996).
36.

Brown, 518 U.S. at 242.

37. See Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargaining in Professional Basebal� 35 VAND. L. RE.v. 1131, 1138 (1982) ("[T]he Article
concludes that collective bargaining and not antitrust law must shape the contours of base
ball's reserve system in the future.").
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The more recent case law and statutes fly in the face of baseball
lore concerning the unique nature of baseball's legal status. The
reality renders traditional arguments about the shame of baseball's
antitrust exemption somewhat exaggerated. A discussion of
whether baseball is the legal anomaly most have believed it to be
for decades38 seems essential in a primer on the subject.
More surprising is Abrams's failure to include reference to
Congress's enactment of the Sports Broadcasting Act in 1961,39
which specifically exempts all professional sports leagues from anti
trust laws for purposes of broadcasting games. Because of the enor
mous industry impact of television and radio contracts and
revenues, any discussion of antitrust law as applied to baseball
should contain a meaningful consideration of the relationship be
tween antitrust laws and broadcasting.40
Sixteen years after Flood v. Kuhn, the 105th Congress enacted
the sentimentally named Curt Flood Act of 1998.41 The legislation
provides that labor relations in major league baseball are specifi
cally not excluded from coverage of the Sherman Act. Abrams
notes in his Conclusion that the agreement between the owners and
players following the 1994-95 strike called for a joint effort to enact
legislation clarifying the status of baseball under antitrust law (p.
201). Passage of the bill, however, is rendered virtually meaningless
by the passage of time.42 The legislation specifically states that the
statute disturbs neither existing statutory and case authority nor ju
dicially created exemptions under antitrust law. It also provides
that franchise relocation, broadcast rights, the amateur draft, and
the status of the relationship between the major and minor leagues
are exempt from antitrust laws.43 It is therefore unclear exactly
what the legislation accomplished, other than bragging rights that
Congress has specifically acknowledged, for the first time in history,
that baseball should be treated the same as other professional
sports for antitrust purposes. This in the same year when the
National Basketball Association owners' lockout of the NBA play
ers threatened to produce the first-ever cancellation of an entire
season in any professional sport.44 Something for baseball to aspire
38.See Kohm, supra note 5, at 1247.
39. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1291-1295 (1994).
40.See MILLER, supra note 22, at 6-9 (labeling television " The One-Eyed Monster");

JAMES QmRK & RODNEY FORT

,

HARDBALL: THE A:susE

OF PoWER IN PRo TEAM SPORTS

27-47 (1999); Robert Alan Garrett & Philip R. Hochberg, Sports Broadcasting and the Law,
59 IND. L.J . 155 (1983-1984); Turland, supra note 5, at 1350-52 (discussing the Sports

Broadcasting Act).
41. Pub .L.No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 27a (West Supp. 1999)).
42. See pp. 201-03; Kohm, supra note 5, at 1241 (" The Irrelevancy of Flood v. Kuhn").
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 27a(b), (d)(4).
44. See Richard Justice & Mark Asher, NBA Labor Dispute Ends After Six Months:
Short Season to Start in February, WASH. PoST, Jan. 7, 1999, at Al.
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to! Some might argue that the bill actually reinforces baseball's ex
emption from most applications of antitrust law.45
Despite its undesirable effects on player careers and compensa
tion for more than a century,46 there is evidence that baseball's pe
culiar legal status actually enabled it to survive two world wars and
a depression.47 Abrams grudgingly acknowledges some upside, but
assigns such benefit only to the owners: "Without question, a se
cure and stable reserve system made good economic sense for the
owners" (p. 46), and "[i]t is possible that the strict reserve system
did increase the total revenue of the baseball industry, and the
owner (and not the players) captured the profit increment. It also
brought order to the business" (p. 52). Undeniably, the advantage
was a period of incubation for baseball's growth and development,
which protected and stabilized the industry. Prosperity was created
not only for owners, but also, ultimately, for major league players
and, in tum, baseball fans and supporters.48
Finally, what Abrams, and others, have always overlooked in
disparaging the outcome in Flood is what may well have happened
legislatively had Flood been decided in the players' favor. There is
no evidence to suggest that the players in 1972 were politically
strong enough to induce Congress to act in their favor.49 As surely
as the owners had lost Flood, they would have turned to Congress
seeking a statutory exemption from the antitrust laws. It is difficult
to imagine that the owners would not have prevailed in such a
quest. A legislated exemption from the antitrust laws (similar to the
statutory exemption for broadcasting purposes discussed above)
would have superseded the National Labor Relations Board's
(NLRB) determination three years before Flood that the NLRB
has jurisdiction over the baseball industry.50 That being true, the
45. Paul Beeson, President and CEO of Major League Baseball, stated concerning the
bill: " This [legislation] shouldn't be read as us [sic] losing our antitrust exemption. We still
have the bulk of our antitrust exemption intact." See Bill King, An Antitrust Bill in Name
Only, SMIIH & STREET'S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Aug. 3-9, 1998, at 3.
46. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 5-6 (Between 1945 and 1965, in "a period of rampant
inflation, the major league minimum [salary] had gone from $5,000 to $6,000 a year. The
average salary was a paltry $19,000, and since World War II, only superstars like Ted
Williams, Stan Musial, Joe DiMaggio, Willie Mays, and Mickey Mantle had reached the unof
fidal maximum of $100,000.").
47. See Mn.LER, supra note 22, at 5.
48. See QmRK & FORT, supra note 40. Ultimately, the game itself may even be getting
better, even as observers complain about the money in baseball. See George F. Will, We
Don't Care If We Never Get Back, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1998, at 61 (" This is the greatest
baseball season since . . . Abner Doubleday . . . invented baseball
).
49. Congress waited 16 years to pass the "Curt Flood Act of 1998." It acted only after the
bill specifically excluded most areas of the baseball industry, various court decisions had se
verely limited the impact of the law, AND the owners agreed not to oppose it. What makes
anyone think the owners wouldn't have succeeded in persuading Congress to codify their
exempt status in the early 1970s?
50. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49.
.
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rest of baseball's story would have turned out quite differently for
the players.
One must be ever mindful that the "baseball gods" (not the
owners, but the cosmic forces of good who hover eternally over
baseball) always know what they're doing· - even when mere
mortals in Congress, the Supreme Court, and those running the
baseball enterprise on earth seem not to. A baseball fan of
Abrams's stature should know that.
BASEBALL

AND

THE

LABOR LAWS

Marvin Miller, Andy Messersmith, and Carlton Fisk
Marvin Miller, the dapper economist from Brooklyn, converted a
social fraternity of baseball players into the strongest trade union in
America. Under his leadership, for the first time in a century of or
ganized baseball, the players received a significant share of the profits
of the baseball enterprise. In the process, however, the game would
be interrupted by periodic work stoppages and employer lockouts. [p.
71]
So begins the chapter on collective bargaining and the most illu
minating discussion in the book. Abrams is clearly at home in the
world of national labor policy, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1930,
the Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin
Acts, the NLRB, collective bargaining, and salary arbitration.
Chapters Six, Seven, and Nine are all devoted to the development
of the baseball players' union and the evolution of the players' stat
ure through the use of the federal labor laws. Through baseball's
rocky labor history, Abrams brings to life various arcane legal con
cepts such as good faith bargaining, arbitration, collusion, and the
roles of management, labor unions, arbitrators, the NLRB,
mediators, and judges.
For example, one of the most compelling points of the entire
book is Abrams's comment in Chapter Four that "[t]he first collec
tive bargaining agreement is always the most difficult to achieve,
and a signed contract is itself a major victory" (p. 83). Abrams ex
plains that most union-organizing efforts fail, and only half of those
that succeed ever yield a written contract.51 According to Abrams,
"the creation of the Basic Agreement [in 1968] fundamentally al
tered the structure of the baseball business."52
More than half of Legal Bases is devoted to a discussion of the
various labor law principles that have freed professional major
51. Abrams cites to no authority for this interesting and rather startling statement.
52. P. 83. The Basic Agreement is the contract for all major league baseball players ne
gotiated by the MLBPA and the owners as a group. Individual player contracts establish
additional terms and conditions for compensation beyond the Basic Agreement. P. 83.
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league baseball players from servitude and made them wealthy.53
Curt Flood may have lost his antitrust case at the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1972, but three years earlier the NLRB, deciding it had
jurisdiction over the baseball industry, had set in motion the events
that would ultimately accomplish Flood's goal: elimination of the
reserve clause. That case was brought to the NLRB by, of all peo
ple, a group of American League umpires, seeking certification to
form a labor union under federal labor laws (pp. 77-79). The
umpires' successful petition paved the way for the rise of the
MLBPA as a powerful union. Now, "[f]or the first time in the his
tory of the baseball enterprise, there was a power in the world
above the owners and the commissioner; there was the law of the
land, not just the internal law of baseball" (p. 82).
Beginning in 1970, the collective bargaining agreement between
the owners and players provided for the arbitration of unresolved
differences between owners and players. In the winter of 1974,
James "Catfish" Hunter became the first "free agent" in baseball
history. Labor arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that Oakland Athletics'
owner Charlie Finley had negated Hunter's contract by failing to
make the contractually required deferred salary payments (pp. 10809). Accordingly, on December 31, 1974, Hunter, no longer bound
by contract to the Athletics, signed a $3.25 million contract with the
New York Yankees. The baseball business had changed forever.54
One year later, Andy Messersmith, a right-handed pitcher for
the Los Angeles Dodgers, and Dave McNally, from the Montreal
Expos, filed a grievance contesting the reserve clauses in their con
tracts. The players argued that the reserve clause could bind them
for only one year beyond the original contract date, absent their
consent, which they refused to give. Pete Seitz, the same arbitrator
who had declared Catfish Hunter a free agent, agreed with the play
ers that the option was for one additional year beyond the original
contract date, not an automatic, perpetual, self-executing renewal
(p. 125). Seitz specifically rejected any analogy to the notion of
"'emancipating players from claimed serfdom or involuntary servi
tude as was alleged in the Flood case'" (p. 126). Nonetheless, he
was fired by the owners as the independent arbitrator within five
minutes of handing down his decision (p. 127). The Seitz decisions
established the legal process that yokes baseball owners and players
together as partners in a great American enterprise, whether they
like it or not.
53. The average major league baseball player salary on the Opening Day rosters in 1998
was $1,444,763. See Qu!RK & FoRT, supra note 40, at 197 tbl.4-2 ("Payrolls & Average Sala
ries, Opening Day Rosters, Major League Baseball, 1998").
54. See p. 109; HELYAR, supra note 9, at 133-50; MILLER, supra note 6, at 236.
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Legal Bases takes the reader through the labor minefields of the
baseball players and owners over the ensuing two decades: the
wars of words, lockouts, work stoppages, collusion cases, and on
going disputes through the baseball strike of 1994-1995, which re
sulted in the cancellation of the 1994 World Series. The parade of
commissioners, the changing of the guard of the players' union
from Marvin Miller to Donald Fehr, and the unsuccessful attempts
by the President of the United States to resolve baseball's bitter
labor strife are chronicled by Abrams in fine fashion with easily
understandable explanations of the labor law principles and proce
dures at play (p. 126, chs. 6-9).
Judge Sonia Sotomayor
Abrams's last All-Star is the federal judge in New York's South
ern District, Sonia Sotomayor,55 who resolved the 1994-1995 strike
by ruling against the owners. Curiously, the litigation that led to
resolution of the strike was several issues removed from the salary
cap, the issue that had triggered the strike in the first place.
The seeds of the strike were planted even before baseball's con
tract expired in 1993. The owners had determined to resolve two
concerns in the next player contract. The first was the redistribu
tion of revenues among the teams, some of which have large in
comes from broadcasting rights and some of which do not,
sometimes referred to in baseball as "large market" and "small
market" teams.56 The second was the wealthy owners' desire to
shift the costs of any such revenue sharing to the players in the form
of a cap on player salaries. The owners dedicated themselves to
"holding the line" on player salaries through a salary cap, absent
which there would be no new contract. The players started the 1994
season and played through the All-Star break without any contract.
But in August 1994, the players went on strike, hoping to force the
owners to the bargaining table in order to obtain a prompt resolu
tion of the issues. The players had been willing to continue with a
Basic Agreement fairly similar to the one that expired in 1993. The
players underestimated the owners' "resolve" (p. 185) to secure
some type of salary cap. It was hard to imagine that the owners
would, in fact, cancel the World Series - but they did.

In December 1994, the owners declared an impasse in negotia
tions and unilaterally imposed their salary cap. In response, the
55. Judge Sotomayor was elevated to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
1998.
56. Only in baseball would Houston or Miami, the 10th and 12th largest cities in the
country, respectively, be referred to as "small markets." See BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1998, at 41-43 tbl.43
("Large Metropolitan Areas - Population: 1980 to 1996").
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MLBPA filed with the NLRB one of several unfair labor practice
charges against the owners before and during the strike (p. 188). A
few weeks later, in early 1995, the owners, in a series of bizarre
moves, first withdrew the salary cap in favor of a 'luxury tax' on
team payrolls. Then, a few days later, they abandoned that scheme
and unilaterally imposed a wholly new set of rules: individual clubs
were suddenly forbidden to sign contracts with individual players,
and portions of the Basic Agreement that provided for salary arbi
tration and prohibited collusion among the owners were rescinded.
The MLBPA immediately filed yet another unfair labor practice
charge against the owners, and, after investigating the complaint,
the NLRB found in favor of the union. The agency filed an en
forcement action against the owners seeking an injunction to keep
them from imposing their new plan (p. 190). It was this case, as
signed to Judge Sotomayor, that ultimately ended the strike. In
Abrams's account,

Judge Sotomayor issued the injunction that the Labor Board re
quested and ordered the owners and the players back to the bargain
ing table.. . . They were ordered to negotiate, in good faith, until one
of three things occurred: (1) they reached an agreement; (2) the
Labor Board issued a final order on the union's underlying unfair la
bor practice allegations; or (3) the parties reached a true impasse after
good faith bargaining. Although the court did not order the players
to "play ball," the union offered to do so, and management accepted.
Against all odds, the 1995 season began on April 26, only a few days
late. [pp. 194-95]
For more than twenty-five years, the rules of baseball have been
supplemented (some would say supplanted) by federal labor law.
One reason is that the leaders of the MLBPA are not baseball play
ers, or even particularly dedicated students of baseball as a sport.
Rather, they are accomplished labor lawyers who don't allow ro
mantic or sentimental notions about the game to interfere with
their duties as labor lawyers on behalf of their clients, the players.57
On the other hand, the owners are a varied assortment of wealthy
individuals and corporate entities who may not necessarily have be
come involved in the industry due to a particular passion for
baseball.58
Such is the result of the decisions by the legal system, the
Congress, and the courts over more than a century during which
federal labor law has come to play such a prominent role in all pro
fessional sports, especially baseball.59 The presence of a final arbi
ter (the NLRB) who is NOT an owner and NOT the Commissioner
57. Seep. 178; HELYAR, supra note 9, at 323-24; MILLER, supra note 6, at 11.
58. See Joanna Cagan & Neil deMause, Bizbrawl: How the Heavy Hitters Are Fighting to
Control the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 66.
59. See Qmruc & FORT, supra note 40, at 49-73.
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of Baseball has proven a necessity for the sport to survive its own
peccadilloes during the last two decades, the best example being the
strike of 1994-1995 (p. 200).
A pressing question for baseball at this juncture is whether the
federal labor laws, apparatus, and procedures offer the most appro
priate forum to best serve baseball's interests in the twenty-first
century. And, if not, what alternative exists or could be created?60
The labor and economic issues between major league players and
owners will not disappear. Certainly, the perennial arguments
about the profitability of the teams, the disparity of broadcasting
revenues, and skyrocketing payrolls are not likely to dissipate in the
near term.61 One wonders if baseball's labor woes will present
themselves as uglier than ever when the current contract expires in
October 2000.
Other challenges loom for baseball. One is the question of pro
viding fairer compensation for minor league players, who constitute
the majority of professional baseball players in America.62 An
other is the quality of training, stature, and representation of the
major league managers and coaches, who normally rise from the
ranks of the players, but are, more often than not, ill-equipped to
successfully manage highly paid workers who earn more than their
bosses. Coaches and managers are not necessarily well represented
by their own agents, nor are they represented by the players' union.
Indeed, once they become part of management, coaches and man
agers are not even allowed by the union to be represented by the
same agents who represent active players. Yet managers are still
tied to the players' pension fund and other union-managed reve
nues from their prior playing careers. The system is odd and has
received little attention, but as team payrolls escalate, the caliber of
those who manage and coach the millionaire players becomes ever
more crucial and problematic.63
No serious baseball fan should neglect to learn at least the
basics of federal labor law because it now dictates much about the
game.64 Hence, the reason for writing - and reading
Legal
-

Bases.
60. See Len Elmore, Reserve Players a Few Seats at the Table ofPower, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS J., Aug. 3-9, 1998, at 35.
61. See Jay Weiner, Baseball's Glory Days Didn't Solve a Thing, Bus. WK., Nov. 9, 1998,
at 166.
62. See David M. Szuchman, Note, Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Callfor the Union
ization of Minor League Basebal� 14 HoFSTRA LAB. LJ. 265 (1996).
63. For a byzantine view of some econometric models "quantifying" the impact of major
league managers on the success of their teams, see GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET
STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 143-69 & app. (1995).
64. For example, the designated hitter rule is a bargaining issue between labor and man
agement. Pp. 192-93.
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CRIMINAL LAW

Pete Rose
Chapter Eight is in this book only because Abrams's baseball
metaphor made it necessary for Abrams to have nine All-Stars. By
adding this "inning," we have a discussion of Pete Rose, baseball
and gambling, baseball and illegal drug use, and the application of
internal baseball procedures to address these societal problems
when they appear within the industry.
The chapter details the events involving Baseball Commissioner
Bart Giamatti's 1989 investigation and banishment of Pete Rose
from baseball for gambling. The findings included the fact that,
while Rose may have bet on his own team, the Cincinnati Reds, he
ALWAYS bet on the Reds to win (p. 158). There is a brief discus
sion of the Hall of Fame and the events that have since conspired to
keep Pete Rose from being voted as a member at Cooperstown.6s
The Pete Rose case is not as clear-cut as Abrams makes it out to
be. 66 While essentially concurring in the banning of Rose from the
Hall of Fame, other observers have differing views of the Commis
sioner's office, the investigation, and what some perceive as
inappropriate procedural actions in the Pete Rose case.67 Abrams
would have better served his readers by providing a more objective
description of the procedures in the Rose matter and incorporating
some of the competing views on the controversial manner in which
this entire subject was investigated, prosecuted, and concluded.
For my part, Cooperstown is not heaven, and the members of
the BBWAA68 are not a grand jury. The Lord will deal with Pete
Rose's sins to the extent that the IRS hasn't already. Cooperstown
is for ballplayers, not saints, and those terms are normally not sy65. Pp. 169-71. There is no mention of Cooperstown's own unique story: that of a pri
vate institution with its strange history and origins. According to baseball historian and stat
istician par excellence Bill James, the idea for a baseball museum in Cooperstown originated
in 1934 when Alexander Cleland, an employee of one of the town's wealthy patrons, pro
posed it to encourage tourists to visit the town each year. See JAMES, supra note 7, at 4.
" The Hall of Fame selection process was an afterthought to an accident. Alexander Cleland
had not set out to create a Hall of Fame; he had set out to create a museum, and this turned
into a Hall of Fame." Id.at 30.
66. Bill James's book, Whatever Happened to the Hall of Fame?, discusses Pete Rose and
captures the complexities of the matter more fully than Abrams does. See JAMES, supra note
7.
67. See id. at 353-58; see also JAMES REsToN, JR., COLLISION AT HoME PLATE: THE
LIVES OF PETE RosE AND BART GIAMArn (1991).
68. The members of the Baseball Writers of America Association vote on admissions to
Cooperstown. See JAMES, supra note 7, at 34-37. For James's thoughts on an alternative (and
better) method of selecting the members of Baseball's Hall of Fame, see id. at 366-80. Essen
tially, James proposes expanding the selection process to include five voting panels from all
segments of the baseball co=unity: the media, fans, players, baseball executives and other
professionals, and baseball scholars. See id.
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nonymous. On the field, Pete Rose has earned his admission to the
Hall of Fame.
CONCLUSIONS
For purposes of a general audience, Legal Bases is a good pri
mer on basic legal principles. The concepts are easily understood,
the applications informative, and the baseball stories entertaining,
as baseball stories are. The problem is that Legal Bases does not
provide a serious baseball student with sufficient in-depth discus
sion of the issues presented. Perhaps the author's goal is to whet an
appetite among baseball fans for pursuit of more detailed history
and analysis in the multitude of other publications on the subject.69
For the baseball fan who happens to be a lawyer, baseball provides
a wealth of legal treatises, scholarly articles, academic analyses, and
symposia proceedings, and a multitude of legal opinions and court
decisions from litigation spanning more than a century.70
Abrams further tarnishes the seriousness of Legal Bases by his
gratuitous inclusion of politically correct references, such as his
comment on the change of the Cleveland team's name from the
Blues to the Indians: "[t]he origin of 'Chief Wahoo,' the present
day Indians' racially offensive logo is unknown'; (p. 208); Abrams's
random discussion of "gender equity" in the future of baseball:
"[t]he next barrier to be broken in professional sports is the inclu
sion of female athletes on previously all-male teams" (p. 204); and a
discussion of the "[g]lobalization" of baseball (p. 205).
But perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the book is Abrams's
philosophical bent which causes him, like most university professors
who write about baseball, to approach the subject as do those dewy
eyed fans who believe that money is ruining the game71:
But after the appointment of Marvin Miller as executive director [of
the Players Association], as we have seen, everything changed, includ
ing the players' self-image. The union turned baseball into a money
machine for the players, and in the process, the baseball enterprise
evolved into a modem entertainment business, no longer simply a
summertime diversion. Baseball lost its innocence, which always had
been part of its charm. [p. 178]
69. Amazon.com lists 6201 titles on the subject of "baseball." See Amazon.com (visited
July 12, 1999) <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subsUhome/home.html/002-22795860482010>.
70. Westlaw searches of databases for law review articles, treatises, texts, and American
Jurisprudence each produce the maximum number of 100 listings for searches of "baseball
and law." Search of WESTLAW, Texts & Periodicals combined Library (Dec. 31, 1998)
(search for documents containing the terms "baseball" and "law"); see also BASEBALL AND
THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND, supra note 14.
71. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 40, passim.
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The ultimate impact of collective bargaining by major league base
ball players is described here (and elsewhere) as having been good
for the players but bad for baseball, as if those two conclusions can
possibly be compatible. Abrams says negative repercussions from
labor-management conflicts have "devastated the mythology, pre
dictability, and sense of tradition that made baseball America's pre
mier professional sport" (p. 89). This stems from the so-called fan
impatience with both players and owners fighting about money .12
Many notable baseball writers and observers lean to that notion,
particularly following a serious labor eruption like the strike of
1981. As Roger Angell wrote in 1981 in Late Innings: A Baseball
Companion, "Most of all, I guess, it's the money that's got me
down."73 Marvin Miller doesn't understand such thoughts: "I love
baseball as it is, and I don't harbor sentimental illusions about it.
I'm constantly amazed at the softheadedness of even the best base
ball writers, who yearn for some remote past where 'money wasn't
so much a part of the game.' When, I wonder, was that time?"74
Consider as well what George F. Will wrote in his 1990 bestseller,
Men At Work: The Craft of Baseball:
Baseball's general health is served by making baseball a more lucra
tive life. It is a matter of supply and demand. The more dollar de
mand there is for talent, the more talent is apt to be supplied. The
pool of money is growing . . . .
Today there are choruses of people lamenting the large salaries
earned by players. This moralizing makes no economic sense. The
salaries are earned: The players make more for the owners than the
owners pay in salaries. But the belief that large amounts of money
must be bad for players is nothing new. A 1914 editorial in a baseball
magazine advised players to ponder the terrible swiftness with which
players become men in the crowd: ". . . A very glaring instance of
[the unwise manner in which baseball players spend their money] is
the recent evil tendency [of baseball players] to purchase and main
tain automobiles."75

Baseball has always engendered mythical thinking and misty
headed analysis from many quarters. Perhaps the quantity of base
ball lore stems from imaginations inspired by the pastoral setting in
which the game is played, a la Bart Giamatti's The Green Fields of
72. See pp. 86, 89. According to President Bill Clinton, the 1995 baseball strike was "just
a few hundred folks trying to figure out how to divide nearly $2 billion. They ought to be
able to figure that out." Quotables, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1995, at 25.

73. ROGER ANGELL, One Hard Way to Make a Living, in LATE INNINGS: A BASEBALL
COMPANION 325, 326 (1982).
74. MILLER, supra note 6, at 412-13.
75. GEORGE F. WILL, MEN AT WoRK: THE CR.AFT OF BASEBALL 308-10 (1990).

May 1999]

Baseball and the Law

2061

the Mind. 76 Or perhaps the sheer longevity of the sport, growing up
alongside the nation itself, has created vast opportunities for
legend, storytelling, and general misinformation.
Learning the story of baseball is akin to studying the Bible: one
can spend years, indeed a lifetime, and make barely a dent in the
seemingly boundless array of literature on the subject. Neverthe
less, there is ample opportunity annually to dedicate oneself to the
task. After all, what other meaningful activity is there to occupy
one's wandering mind between the last out of the World Series in
October and mid-February when pitchers and catchers report? In
any case, Legal Bases: Baseball and the Law is a good starting point
for one's quest to know more about how baseball came to its cur
rent condition, whatever one perceives that condition to be.

76. A. BARTLETI GIAMA'ITI, The Green Fields of the Mind, in A GREAT AND GLoruous
GAME 7 (Kenneth S. Robson ed., 1998).

